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ABSTRACT: Privileging deductive first principles over inductive contingencies, I argue, contributed to
the economic meltdown of late and will continue to limit the range of reasonable solutions available
to solve entrenched economic problems. I cite Toulmin’s critique of scientific certainty and the
rancor over the demise of the ninth planet Pluto to posit a role for rhetoric in making valid claims
across all fields of study, calling for more productive uncertainty subject to vigorous argumentation.
KEYWORDS: Adam Smith, deduction, economics, financial crisis, induction, philosophy, political
economy, rhetoric, scientific method

1. INTRODUCTION
The last forty years of American economic policy, according to former longtime head
of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, marked an experiment to test the assumed
efficacy of persons acting in their self-interest for the benefit of all. In response to
questions from a US Congressional committee seeking information about the causes
of the financial collapse of 2008, Greenspan conceded,
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically
banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own
shareholders and their equity in their firms (Corn, 2008).

The disastrous results of such presumptive certainty spread around the globe,
pointing to errors in the model. Modern mainstream economists, at least by
Greenspan’s own account, created the conditions for an economic collapse fostered
by a mistaken characterization of Adam Smith’s ideas—highlighting the presumed
sanctity of self-interested behavior and the widespread benefits of the “invisible
hand.” What is hardly mentioned by strident free market purists and advocates of
deregulation is that Smith balanced notions of an open marketplace with social and
civic responsibility, armed as he was with a profound appreciation of human
behavior and knowledge of rhetoric. I cite Smith’s overtly rhetorical and less
dogmatic approach in his Wealth of Nations to contrast this with the deductive leap
taken by political economists in his wake; yet, it was the same Smith who admired
the use of first principles as a professor of rhetoric and advocated it to his students.
Under the banner of the didactic method, Smith advised in lectures:
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[I]n the manner of Sir Isaac Newton, we may lay down certain principles, primary or
proved, in the beginning, from whence we account for the several phenomena,
connecting all together by the same chain . . . It gives us pleasure to see the
phenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable, all deduced from some
principle . . . (Smith, 1971, p. 140)

Newton’s manner, as Smith calls it, became what Stephen Toulmin calls “the physics
that never was” (2001, p. 55), and found adherents for its ability to predict in a
stable universe, with little need to debate infallible first principles. In this essay, I
trace the path and consequences of emulating the methods of Newton in pursuit of
certainty in the field of economics. Before tracing the historical developments that
contributed to the transformation of the (mainly) inductive philosophy of early
political economy to the (mainly) deductive science of latter-day economics, I want
to briefly foreground Smith’s ambivalent relationship with deduction and induction
in his own writings with the help of one of Plato’s most insightful dialogues on the
conflict between rhetoric and dialectic: Protagoras.
Plato’s Protagoras provides a dramatic demonstration of the age-old split
between rhetoric and philosophy and disputes over methods so central to the
transformation of political economy to the science of economics. Socrates pays a
visit to the famous sophist (and namesake of the dialogue) to find out why he thinks
virtue can be taught. Protagoras, an eloquent speaker in love with the sound of his
own voice, draws upon historical, cultural, and social themes to defend his position
that, indeed, virtue is teachable. Meanwhile, Socrates is impatient with Protagoras’
voluminous yet spellbinding speech, and he insists on short answers to brief
questions to move the dialectical contest forward to the truth (and, of course, secure
a victory) (Plato, 1989, 334e-325). In the end, the debate disintegrates into a puerile
pouting-match between the foes, and, for Plato, a demonstration of the hubris of
human beings and corresponding pitfalls of using contrastive methods in pursuing
truth. To illustrate my analogy, Socrates plays the deductive/abstract philosopher
(qua-scientist) and Protagoras the inductive/historical sophist (qua-rhetorician).
Moving back to Smith, I see him as a bit of both Protagoras and Socrates: inductive
rhetorician and deductive philosopher. Smith “recognized the patent contradiction
between reality on the ground and conclusions drawn solely from deduction”
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 137), and so Smith’s “methodology was eclectic,” with a blend of
the “empirical, the theoretical, the institutional, the philosophical, the static, and the
dynamic . . . all intermingled” (Sowell, as cited in Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 16). In
short, he applied deductive and inductive methods, and for the rest of economic
history to the present, the two sides of Smith, like the estranged children of
Abraham, began their own antagonistic methodological economic traditions. Irish
historical economist, Cliffe Leslie, first noted this in 1870, pointing to the “dualism”
in Smith that split into two distinct schools with opposite methods: “[o]ne of them is
represented by [David] Ricardo as the founder of the deductive method; the other of
which [Robert] Malthus and [John Stuart] Mill are the chief representatives,
combines a priori and inductive methods” (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 18). Although
Smith “employed deductive reasoning,” it was “not of an axiomatic nature,” and as “a
keen observer . . . of history and different societies” he “frequently used facts to
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illustrate arguments. In short, his deductions were usually empirically founded”
(John Phedy, as cited in Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 18). Smith may have lectured
admiringly about Newton’s method, nevertheless, his Wealth of Nations reasons
from inductive to deductive proofs.
It wasn’t until 1870 when economics, as a newly emerging social science,
began to take on in earnest earlier attempts to emulate Newton’s physics. In his
lectures, years before he wrote the Wealth of Nations, Smith discerns two distinct
methods in didactic, or instructional, writing; one associated with Aristotle and the
other with Newton:
[I]n Natural Philosophy, or any other science of that sort, we may either, like
Aristotle, go over the different branches in the order they happen to [be] cast up to
us, giving a principle, commonly a new one, for every phenomenon; or, in the
manner of Sir Isaac Newton, we may lay down certain principles, primary, or
proved, in the beginning, for whence we account for the several phenomena,
connecting all together by the same chain. This latter, which we may call the
Newtonian method, is undoubtedly the most philosophical, and in every science,
whether of Morals or Natural Philosophy, etc., is vastly more ingenious, and for that
reason more engaging, than the other. (Smith, 1971, p. 140)

Sharing Smith’s glowing appraisal of Newton’s method was a new professional class
of experts in the various emerging studies that would become the social sciences.
Smith scholar Pierre Force ponders Smith’s contrastive methods in his two famous
works, giving some understanding of the rhetorical method of inquiry and role of
primary and subordinate propositions in both. Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments,
Force notes, “operates in more geometrico,” advancing a first principle (sympathy)
followed by the consequences of those principles (2003, p. 127). By contrast, in the
Wealth, Force adds, Smith employs an analytic strategy, beginning with a problem
“(what are the causes of the wealth of nations?), and he gradually analyzes the
problem, by identifying explanatory principles that are more and more general”
(2003, p. 127). The attraction of this strategy to Smith in the Wealth seems to be that
it allows an unfolding of general principles grounded in moral precepts drawn from
actual examples of human behavior. In this light, one can view Smith as a rhetorician
and moral philosopher who applied his methods to the problems of political
economy.
In an attempt to gain the status of a pure science in a Newtonian sense, the
philosophy of political economy, etched with historical, social, and ethical concerns
had to be jettisoned and left to re-organize as separate fields of study. Recalling
Plato’s dramatic dialogue in Protagoras, wherein Socrates’ concept of virtue as an
individual’s choice for pleasure over pain (1989, 357a-b) (the proto-utility
maximizing self-contained unit) is pitted against Protagoras’ concept of a pluralistic
participatory virtue hashed out in the public forum (1989, pp. 327-328) (a
rhetorically-defined individual situated in a social political arena)—these two
contrastive methods of discovering virtue in classical philosophy and rhetoric mimic
competing methods in economics. Rhetoric, as Protagoras maintains, decides the
meaning of public attitudes about virtue in the public forum, informed by historical
and sociopolitical contingencies (and where reasonable/inductive methods
3
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predominate), whereas, Socrates’ dialectic of scientific certainty (rational/deductive
methods held to a standard of non-contradiction) is a closed business to serious
minds (at that time, philosophers, today, perhaps economists) bound to the rules of
game, leaving aside the contingent concerns so important to rhetoric. Both sides
insist that their own methods are necessary conditions to reach truth. Put another
way: for Protagoras, virtue exists in speech acts carried on in public and informed by
historical and social precedents; for Socrates, virtue exists—period—the properties
of which can be discovered with the proper methods of inquiry.
After Smith and the advent of more rigorous scientific approaches, British
commentators debated the vices and virtues of shedding social and hence moral
responsibility from political economy to move toward a disinterested economic
“reality” (a move from labor and class analysis to a science of distribution and
exchange theory, as it has since become) (Milonakis & Fine, 2009). This snowballed
into a serious professional feud over the purpose and methods of political economy
characterized by economic historian Arnold Toynbee in the early 1880s as a “bitter
argument between economists and human beings” (as cited in Winch, 1996, p. 6). As
one might guess, the argument continues, a subject that requires a look at a myopic
desire for scientific certainty across the social sciences and particularly in the study
of economics.
In the pages ahead, I examine the limits imposed to inquiry in the
transformation of political economy to the science of economics, which is shorthand
for the privileging of rationality over reason, certainty over rhetoric, deduction over
induction, and ideology over material reality. In addition, this will entail a review of
the challenges to contemporary rhetoric that have their origins in its strained
relationship with scientific rationality, which ruptured in earnest with the advent of
the Enlightenment and the privileging of scientific rhetoric.1 In course, this will
necessitate a look at rhetoric’s equally strained relationship with the natural and
social sciences once housed in the catchall field of study known as Philosophy. I will
conclude by making a case for rhetoric and productive irony (the product of
uncertainty), but first, I begin with a story that I think narrows the difference
between knowledge production as science or rhetoric, and outlines the scope of
persuasion in fields long deemed unimproved by the study and application of
rhetoric—a look at rhetoric’s troubled relationship with scientific logic illustrated
within the brief history of the planet Pluto.
2. PLUTO’S DESCENT AND THE LONG NIGHT OF RHETORIC
“Whoa! Pluto's dead," said astronomer Mike Brown, of the California Institute of
Technology in Pasadena, as he watched a Webcast of the vote. "There are finally,
officially, eight planets in the solar system.” (Iman, 2006, p. 1)

1I

say “scientific rhetoric” instead of “scientific method,” because as Richard Rorty points out, “A
quarrel about method requires a common goal, and a disagreement about the means of reaching it”
(1982, p. 196). Part of my criticism is aimed at the rhetorical application of scientific methods in
social scientific fields that may or may not share a common goal, and only tangentially with “The
Scientific Method” in situ.
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In 2005, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) decided to end the career of
Pluto, which had been widely viewed as the ninth planet since its discovery in the
1930s. The majority of researchers ruled Pluto did not fit a rearticulated definition
of a planet, which included orbiting the sun, possessing enough mass to assume a
round shape, and being large enough to dominate its orbit. Pluto failed on the last of
the three requirements (there were other planetoid objects sharing its orbit), with a
few participants dissenting (Iman, 2006, pp. 1-2). Of course, Pluto did not become a
planet through scientific observation alone, and just as quickly as the “known facts”
of the time created the ninth planet, debate and “other facts” could undo it. Alan G.
Gross’s The Rhetoric of Science helps us to appreciate the rhetorical and truly
unremarkable nature of the Pluto controversy, as he argues that scientific
knowledge is not special, but rather, social. He notes that “scientific discovery is
properly described as invention . . . To discover is to find out what is already there”
(Gross, 1990, p. 7), so, he adds, “discovery is not a description of what scientists do:
it is a hidden metaphor that begs the question of the certainty of scientific
knowledge” (Gross, 1990, p. 7). In other words, a rhetorical metaphor of discovery
helped to launch the ninth planet, and thus a new invention (a definition, no doubt
wrangled over and pleasing no one completely) could return it to just another large
icy rock orbiting the sun. The gist of the claim is that “planets are like this, not like
that.” Outside and inside the scientific community, many were aghast, hurt, and
angry.2 I’m sure many science teachers tried to explain to their disillusioned
students what even some astronomers failed to appreciate. As Gross explains,
If scientific theories are discoveries, their unfailing obsolescence is difficult to
explain; if these theories are rhetorical inventions, no explanation of their radical
vulnerability is necessary. (Gross, 1990, p. 7)

The politics of science reveals what many would rather not know: scientific
certainty (what is assumed to be known at any given time), like other kinds of
knowledge and opinion, has a shelf life of unknown duration. Truths, like opinion,
are not stable, but ever shifting moments of consensus achieved through using
language, however strong the “evidence” appears to be. No wonder many people
balked—what other “truths” could fall from the sky?
Pluto, the former planet, is not the primary concern, but rather, its
emblematic role as a character spanning the gulf between pure science and applied
rhetoric. It turns out that planets cannot exist without agreed upon physical
properties and consensus regarding proper terminology. In this case, deciding what
it means to be a planet.3 As Kenneth Burke says, “Wherever there is ‘meaning,’ there

2Some

thought Pluto and some forty-plus similar objects that did not dominate their orbits should be
called planets. A few sought an exemption for Pluto, and still others suggested Pluto be included in a
new class of so-called dwarf planets. A few said that they would go on regarding Pluto as a planet
(Iman, 2006, p. 2). It was widely reported than many schoolchildren, unaccustomed to reversals of
catechistic thought, protested and pouted—vowing to never surrender their belief in a ninth planet.
The meaning of a new definition must be argued, it cannot be discovered. The deliberation
concerning what a planet is provides a case point: “But for now the vote is drawing some opposition.
3
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is persuasion,” and persuasion is rhetoric (as cited in Booth, 2004, p. 171). Science
as a language practice, in this sense, follows a pattern found in Aristotle’s judicial
and deliberative discourses: “So let it be argued, so let it be decided, so let it be
done.” Science and its social science cousins often leave these more political aspects
of bargaining and wrangling definitions out of the picture. Once in a while, a crisis
like the status of Pluto becomes untenable within the community of experts charged
with knowing what is and is not a planet, and then non-experts get to see how the
experts do things. There would be dissent, but the collective will of the voting
assembly will stand for now.4
Rhetoric most certainly played a key role in this change, or, in an ironically
apropos statement by Gross, “Science is less a matter of truth than of making
worlds” (1990, p. 205). Pluto’s fall from the heavens illustrates the hand of rhetoric
in domains often viewed as hostile to it, and shows the suasive at work in all
disciplines, from philosophy and social sciences, to the so-called hard and soft
sciences.
Stephen Toulmin’s Return to Reason ends with a clarion call for more
certainties like Pluto to fall from the sky:
Our first intellectual obligation is to abandon the Myth of Stability that played so
large a part in the Modern age: only thus can we heal the wounds inflicted on
Reason by the seventeenth–century obsession with Rationality, and give back a
Reasonableness the equal treatment of which it was for so long deprived. (Toulmin,
2001, p. 214)

What this entails, Toulmin argues, is recognition of “the reasonableness of
narratives” as contrasted with “the rigor of formal proofs,” which further shows the
difference between “local knowledge of the patterns we find in concrete events, and
the universal, abstract understanding embodied in purely theoretical points of view”
(2001, p. 15). Toulmin is preparing the ground for an acceptance of the validity of
non-formal proofs across the professional disciplines, and he opens up the
possibility that rhetorical analysis can disturb an impenetrable scientific pretense
that is borrowed from physics and made to apply to disciplines in the social
sciences, especially economics. The story of Pluto and its planetary ambitions is,
ironically, a fitting place to begin this examination, as Isaac Newton’s theories about
the workings of the planets took part in the creation of the scientific certainty as it
stands today.
Returning to Toulmin’s narrative, he traces the historical events that
hastened what he calls a split between reason and rationality. He asks,

Planetary scientist Andy Cheng said the definition is ambiguous, because it hasn't answered the
question ‘how round is round?’" (Iman, 2006, p. 2).
Alan G. Gross observes a conceptual voting assembly in a less absolutist science: “Indeed, this
absolutist view of scientific truth now has an alternative, a sophisticated relativism in which truth
depends not on conformity to a substratum of reality, but on agreement among significant persons”
(1990, p. 21).
4
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Why was Newtonian dynamics seen as the type example of a Serious Science, to be
emulated by economists, sociologists, and psychologists no less than physiologists
and biochemists? Why were social scientists so keen to be the ‘Newtons’ of social
theory? (Toulmin, 2001, p. 47)

He isolates Newton’s Principia Mathematica (influenced by the axiomatic simplicity
of Euclidean geometry) as the pivotal text that set the standard for future scientific
works emphasizing universal laws and stable truths (Toulmin, 2001, p. 48). Toulmin
calls this “the physics that never was” (2001, p. 55) because, as Newton’s
contemporary and arch-critic Gottfried Leibniz observed, his
theorems proved only that the Law of Gravitation accounts for the motions of one
planet at a time around a more massive center of attraction, such as the Sun. With
this simplification, the equations of motion for a single planet are easily solved . . .
[but] [o]nce we introduce into the picture a third body—say a second planet—the
equations are, however, no longer algebraically soluble. (Toulmin, 2001, p. 50,
emphasis in original)

In short, Newtonians had to use “arithmetical dodges” to explain deviations from his
simplified orbits (Toulmin, 2001, pp. 50-51). This doesn’t mean that Newtonian
physics wasn’t a groundbreaking achievement and empirically useful, it simply
means that Newton’s hope of showing a predictably rational God through a
predictably rational Universe was flawed5 (Toulmin, 2001, p. 55). The beauty and
simplicity of his equations purporting a stable planetary system could not describe
the actual workings of the solar system, thus, Toulmin says that “the model that for
so long held center stage as the ‘the ideal form of theory for any would-be Science’
remained that of a Physics that Never Was” (2001, p. 55). Borrowing the form and
method (the rhetoric) of physics, social scientists hoped to achieve three goals:
a) an abstract theory with a rigorously valid axiom system, b) deductions of the
nature of human institutions from its universal principles, and 3) scientific
explanations of the character of particular social institutions. Yet this triple prize
was never a realistic possibility: it had never been achieved even in planetary
astronomy. (Toulmin, 2001, p. 54)

The legacy of emulating physics is seen especially in economics, where universal
applications of principles have been “wrong-headed or even disastrous” (Toulmin,
2001, p. 60). Toulmin cites the intervention of modern economic theory on the
Island of Bali, where “rational” attempts to increase rice production caused plagues
of pests and funguses on a biblical scale. The problem with abstract solutions based
upon a universal principles is not tied to an inherent flaw in technology or
economics, but rather, in a belief that their solutions can be founded and applied
without consulting the entire web of practices and beliefs of the people they are
Regarding the stability of the universe: “Astronomers may have discovered the aftermath of a
collision between a Saturn-size planet and a smaller world, perhaps the size of Uranus, some 170
light-years away” (Lovett, 2008). Toulmin notes, “in our own time the dynamics of our planetary
system are still a matter of public concern,” citing other collisions between planetary objects and dire
predictions of an asteroid hitting the earth (2001, p. 54).
5

7

JERRY PETERSEN
supposed to help (Toulmin, 2001, pp. 60-61). If a vibrant rhetoric of economics is to
move beyond an adherence to numbers and predictions, it must include actual
human needs, histories, social conditions, cultural beliefs, and stories. At the heart of
Toulmin’s analysis is his plea for ways of thinking and postulating reality that retain
a narrative sensibility. Following this, it is helpful to review the current status of
rhetoric as a field and what is lost by its formal ostracism from serious science.
Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Rhetoric explores, among other things, how
neglecting the study of persuasion can make some problems impossible to solve
without violence or stagnation. Booth sees a role and agenda for rhetoric in the 21st
century—to combat dishonest, fraudulent, and contemptible rhetoric. For Booth the
remedy is more rhetorical education not less (2004, pp. xi-xii). What Booth wants is
recognition of the uses of rhetoric in all fields, and for professionals to ask what
constitutes good and bad forms of persuasion in each discipline (2004, p. xii). “Bad”
persuasion comes in many forms, and a virulent strain comes from claims of
scientific certainty in domains better served by rhetoric sensitive to the political
exigencies and needs of the community it addresses. As English Studies have long
explored the texts of powerful fictional literature, Rhetoric Studies should engage
the persuasive fictions of economics that wield so much power,6 reclaiming for
study the various compartments Aristotle included in his Rhetoric—ethics, politics,
psychology, logic, history, and poetics (Burke, 2008, p. 51).
The split between formal logic and reason (rhetoric) might be tolerable or
even admirable in a world that recognized the same distinctions within human
affairs. Perhaps we should be grateful that there can be neither purely logical nor
purely rhetorical endeavors, for this is what makes us human. Antonio Grassi, in
Rhetoric as Philosophy, writing about the Italian Humanists’ response to Descartes’
war on the humanities, points to the same issue in the realm of philosophical
studies, which, he claims, is hobbled by the eviction of probable, situated, and
politically prudent courses of action in favor of single standard of truth:
The defects of rationalistic, critical philosophy are much more than they appear at
first sight. By failing to take into account political faculties and the art of eloquence,
this philosophy disregards two of the most important branches of human activity.
The one-sided concern about truth misses the preparation for recognizing
individual cases, and it ignores the necessity for political education. (Grassi, 1980, p.
40)

With political education, we return to the realm of rhetoric, which includes concerns
about ethics and morals, and which must deliberate with care to the collective and
individual, not universals. Here, we can hear echoes of Booth’s manifesto and
Toulmin’s claim (repeated by contemporary rhetoricians across the board) that
neglect of the virtues of rhetoric (i.e. argument and debate) limits the ability of
problems to be addressed by negating a whole range of arguments now deemed
extrinsic to thoughtful consideration.
Victor Villanueva, in “Toward a Political Economy of Rhetoric,” laments the lack of attention to the
economic texts that carry so much ideological weight and referee material outcomes, writing: “There
is a rhetoric of economics, a rhetoric of political economy. We need only to reclaim it” (2005, p. 62).
6
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In the final analysis, the “scientific method,” like other uses of language that
persuade and construct a vision of reality, is both rhetorical and ideological. For
many early followers of Newton and Galileo, both of whom used mathematical
symbols to represent the natural world, the vocabulary of science was closer to
truth, to God. Many thought that the language itself represented a new window on
reality. For Richard Rorty, the success wasn’t due to “something called the ‘scientific
method,’” but rather, it was the ability to finally predict with “simple mathematical
ratios” (1982, p. 191).
Galileo and his followers discovered, and subsequent centuries have amply
confirmed, that you get much better predictions by thinking of things as masses of
particles blindly bumping each other than by thinking of them as Aristotle thought
of them—animistically, teleologically, and anthropomorphically. They also
discerned that you get a better handle on the universe by thinking of it as infinite
and cold and comfortless than by thinking it as finite, homey, planned, and relevant
to human concerns. (Rorty, 1982, p. 191)

Echoes of the siren call of objectivity are apparent here, and the need to remove the
human from such a cold and mechanical natural world. Galileo, Rorty tells, believed
his “vocabulary worked because it fitted the universe as a key fits a lock” (1982, p.
192). Kant suggested those with the key, perhaps unwittingly, made the lock (Rorty
1982, p. 192). In any case, the cat was out of the bag, and it appears that the method
of science is not so different from what humans do in every activity:
They check off examples against criteria; they fudge the counter-examples enough
to avoid the need for new models; they try out various guesses, formulated within
the current jargon, in the hope of coming up with something which will cover up the
unfudgeable cases. (Rorty, 1982, p. 193)

Newton’s calculations were also simplified, and mathematical dodges used to “cover
up the unfudgeables.” This sounds a lot like the way planets are “discovered” and
demoted. In fact, the Pluto story recounts the use of criteria (how to define a planet);
a fudging of counter-examples (other orbiting objects equal in size to Pluto but not
called planets); a new model that becomes no longer avoidable (having been fudged
for too long many astronomers believed); and so the process begins again, with new
jargon (terminology) to describe a planet, and new criteria with a different quality
of fudging (i.e., “how round is round?” (Iman, 2006, p. 2)—not perfect, but
eliminating today’s inconsistencies).
3. EMBRACING RHETORIC, UNCERTAINTY, AND IRONY
So, in answer to those in the humanities seeking to find the magic formulae to the
success of the sciences through a rhetoric that mirrors reality, Rorty replies,
Galileo’s terminology is the only ‘secret’ he had—he didn’t pick that terminology
because it was ‘clear’ or ‘natural’ or ‘simple,’ or in line with the categories of the
pure understanding. He just lucked out. (p. 193)
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I suppose this means that Galileo did what anyone faced with a rhetorical challenge
must do: find a way to communicate a message to an intended audience. The point is
that science and social science do not differ in their methods as a rule, as they both
employ a language designed to convince. Social scientist can use scientific
terminology when they want to convince that they can predict, and this can be
successful (especially if this is what audiences expect), but the practical realizations
of those predictions are markedly less so. As Rorty points out, “the last fifty years of
research in the social sciences have not notably increased our predictive abilities”
(Rorty, 1982, p. 197; see also Taleb, 2007).
What Toulmin, Grassi, and Rorty all prize is the ability of the humanities and
social sciences to tell us stories, to interpret other people to us, and to introduce us
to subjective experiences in the world we share but often see so differently. In a
rhetorical practice that doesn’t deny the homey comfort of human emotions, and in
which individual and cultural narratives are allowed to commingle with now less
“cold” and less “value-neutral” facts, there is potential for “enlarging and deepening
our sense of community” (Rorty, 1982, p. 203). Rorty hopes that
[w]hen the notion of knowledge as representation goes, then the notion of inquiry
as split into discrete sectors with discrete subject matter goes. . . . The lines between
subject matters are drawn by reference to current practical concerns, rather than
putative ontological status. (p. 203)

Here, I see Rorty’s neo-pragmatism (or anti-theory theory) capturing the challenge
for rhetoric studies moving forward. Speaking to practical concerns of
contemporary rhetoric, a study of the rhetorics-across-the-disciplines should be
aware of its own fudging of counter-examples and, taking a cue from Booth, they
should be alert to the “good” as well as the “bad” in the social sciences. Rorty points
out that Michel Foucault saw the dark side of social science (“instruments of
domination”) while John Dewey saw the hopeful side (“social engineering”) (1982,
p. 204). Rorty opts for hope above gloom, and a possibility for transformation of
institutions through solidarity and collective action (1982, p. 208). Of course,
rhetoric, like science, can evince a common picture of the world by consulting its
various components, but we should be mindful of limitations even as we celebrate
its capacity. Steve Fuller and James H. Collier, seeking to build interdisciplinary
connection across the humanities and social sciences, see contemporary rhetoric as
insightful to the ways knowledge is produced and communicated. They also remind
us that friends of rhetoric
tend to overemphasis the community-building functions of well-chosen language,
often harboring some fairly nostalgic (if not downright mythical) views about the
degree of common ground that is achievable or desirable between people. (Fuller &
Collier, 2004, p. 14)

I too find hope irresistible, but a little gloom and doom, and large measure of “what
other people think” can help keep rhetoricians from over-fudging their own
accounts.
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There have been other calls to bridge the divide between methodological
camps. Of course, according to Aristotle, both methods need each other, as the
deductive and inductive dialectic method defines certainties to the point where
parties can at least agree to the terms and issues to be discussed, at which point
rhetoric steps in to finish the job of proposing a course of action (a judgment or an
attitude is reached). This is the rhetoric of particular cases: (non-universal)
questions of probable truth (Kennedy, 1963, p. 96-7). William James, offering
pragmatism as the answer to the dichotomy between humanism and science, writes,
You want a scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the
spirit of adaption and accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in
human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or the
romantic type. (as cited in McCloskey, 1994 , p. 70)

Deidre McCloskey says, “Economists can do better than taking sides between
thought and feeling, between the Sciences and the Humanities” (1994, p. 70).
Modern economics needs to reengage the methods of Adam Smith, McCloskey holds,
by “analyzing both action and behavior, understanding the reasonableness of what
people do down in the ruck of the market and seeing them also ‘from the eighth
floor,’ as a sociologist put it” (1994, p. 70). The problem is complicated, because, as
Milonakis and Fine explain, “whilst economics profoundly reflects historical and
social processes both materially and ideologically, it is blissfully ignorant of them
and wishes to remain so” (2009, p. 4).
In The Rhetoric of Economics, Deidre McCloskey defines all economics as
rhetorical because it is “speech with intent” to persuade, and although she concedes
(along with Booth) that rhetoric is “not everything,” it is “everywhere in the speech
of human persuaders” (1998, p. 8). McCloskey points out that modern economists
with exclusive scientific pretensions such as
Robert Solow or Milton Friedman do not know anything of classical rhetoric—they
grew up at the nadir of rhetorical education—but they can spot when a formal
assumption is being used well or badly, and they can sense when this or that verbal
device is appropriate. And the wordcraft that the best economists exercise by
instinct can be taught, at least a little. (McCloskey, 1998, p. 5)

The notion of teaching rhetoric is bound with the notion of teaching virtue, a contest
also explored in the conflict between Socrates and Protagoras. Focusing on the kinds
of stories economists like to tell, McCloskey also apprehends a proving of opposites
as conducive to a shared search for meaning and the ability of “small t” truth to
explain reality, suggesting that a “variety in economic narratives is good for the soul.
Marxist narrative provides a criticism of the bourgeoisie ‘neo-classical’ narrative,
and vice versa” (McCloskey, 1998, p. 146). Booth celebrates the call and response of
answering rhetoric with still more rhetoric in the form of powerful narratives to
counter other powerful narratives, noting that the “serious ethical disasters
produced by narratives occur when people sink themselves into an unrelieved hot
bath of one kind of narrative” (as cited McCloskey, 1990, p. 146). Recalling
Greenspan’s testimony in front of congress about “smart people,” the best minds of
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the Federal Reserve, who could not foresee the 2008 collapse of the economy (Corn,
2008), an adherence to preferred perspectives and covert rhetorical methods of
inquiry (both grounds for “small t” truth and “big T” Truth) is the hot water of the
current crisis. The rhetorical appeal of methodologies bound to first principles (a
rhetoric of method) may be aesthetically pleasing but not necessarily the route to
unimpeachable truth. In his lectures on rhetoric, Smith, in another demonstration of
his ambivalence concerning method, seizes upon the distinction between a
perception of truth earned by following a method and an actual apprehension of
reality:
We need not be surprised, then, that the Cartesian philosophy (for Descartes was in
reality the first who attempted this method), though it does not perhaps contain a
word of truth,—and to us who live in a more enlightened age and have more
inquired into these matters, it appears very dubious,—should nevertheless have
been so universally received by all the learned in Europe at that time. The great
superiority of the method over that of Aristotle, the only one then known, and the
little inquiry which was then made into those matters, made them greedily receive a
work which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining romances that have ever
been wrote (sic). (Smith, 1971, p. 40)

Smith has it right. Indeed, a great story made great by its rhetorical method is likely
to deceive by its appearance of infallibility. In the realm of one-sided economics,
where one hand (the rational scientific) does the work of the other (the reasonable
social), the consequences are disastrous. We need Protagoras and Socrates, and a
host of other voices to school us in the range of disagreement required to live a
critical life. Trumpeting the need for vigorous argumentation, McCloskey writes,
If economists tell stories and exercise an ethical sense when telling them, then they
had better have as many stories as possible. This is a principled justification of
pluralism, an argument for not keeping all one’s eggs in a single narrative basket. If
you are accustomed to thinking in Platonic terms within which knowledge consists
mainly in propositions like the irrationality of the square root of two, provable now
and forever, then monism looks attractive. There’s One Truth out there, isn’t there. If
you are by contrast accustomed to thinking in Aristotelian terms within which
knowledge consists of judgments like the desirability of democracy, uncertain even
when agreed to after much discussion of people of good will, then monism in the
tales we tell looks foolish, as it is. (McCloskey, 1990, p. 146)

In Protagoras the debacle between Socrates and Protagoras is perhaps another
moment in which Plato shows us the problem of democracy, which is a good
problem to have, considering the alternatives; but pluralism in the economics of
modern American democracy (in theory and policy) is rarely honored or practiced,
except in times of periodic crisis, when alternatives are required to save face and
prevent further harm (bailouts, new deals, stimulus packages, and all the rest). In
spite of reasonable voices pointing to facts on the ground that undermine the
professed success in the last forty years of neo-liberal laissez faire policies (see
Klein, 2007; Greider, 1997; Chang, 2008; Phillips, 2008), modern mainstream
economics occupies the rostrum, that is, until something bad happens, to be
followed by a band aid approach to “saving markets” while the fundamental
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problems remain. The experiment in free-markets as a panacea to human fulfillment
and harmony (Greenspan’s “it was working exceptionally well” (Corn, 2008))
represents a lack of productive irony—productive in the sense of proposing less
“certain” but more “reasonable” versions of reality. If rhetoric may be accused of
deliberately producing irony, then it may wear that accusation quite well. Burke
notes in his dramatistic analogue to dialectical rhetorical speech that in “a
development that uses all the terms . . . (this ‘perspective of perspectives’), none of
the participating ‘sub-perspectives’ can be treated precisely right or precisely wrong
(1969, p. 512, emphasis in original). In other words, Burke observes how rhetorical
debates are similar to dramatic performances, wherein, “all voices, or personalities,
or positions, integrally [affect]one another” (1969, p.512). The economic crisis was
nurtured by a dominating sub-perspective of a scientifically modeled economics
that fudges to accommodate messy practical contingencies apparent to contrary
voices in the dialectic performance. An extreme deductive and positivist mainstream
economics like Milton Friedman’s begins with assumptions “that need bear no
relation to reality; it can even be claimed that theory has greater purchase the more
unrealistic its assumptions”(Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 69). In this “theoretical
world,” if “ex post reality checks” (data to verify or falsify) do not confirm the
theory, this can “be accommodated by appropriate statistical manipulation or model
refinement” (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 69). In other words, more fudging to make
the beautiful models function as intended.
In this light, concerns about the loss of “positive” knowledge in a world of
“relative” claims are wholly misplaced. “In relativism,” Burke says (applying a
rigorous definition of the word) “there is no irony,” because it sees “but one set of
terms,” and so in a strict sense, a relative viewpoint is, ironically, a sub-certainty
parading as the absolute last word on the subject7 (1969, pp. 512-513). So much for
the line between pure and fuzzy truths, and Burke offers a continuum, or ratio, to
measure the ironic inverse relationship: “the greater the absolutism of the
statements, the greater the subjectivity and relativity in the position of the agent
making the statements” (1969, pp. 512). An absolute stand is “relativistic” if this
means choosing one reigning side of a dialectical situation in its entirety. Irony is a
suspension of contraries, neither totally right nor totally wrong, and thus, what is ‘A’
can return as ‘non-A’ (i.e., Pluto the planet and not a planet), even if it means
abandoning certainty for irony.
Irony is integral to the human condition; perhaps this is why it is the stuff of
great drama and tragedy, but a bit of certainty is good for ease of mind and a
measure of common ground. So, what to make of charges of relativism (this time the
“relativism” as bogeyman to rational thinking) against those who condone a more
rhetorical pursuit of “small t” truth? If “relativism” is taken to mean, “anything goes,
arguments are all equal, scholarship does not advance, [and] we have no way of
reaching common ground,” then McCloskey, and other reasonable and rational
people, condemn this too (McCloskey, 1994, p. 315). That brand of “relativism” is the
bogeyman of clear thinking, but the good news is that “[i]f there were any real
One might call this a tu quoque, as it does insinuate that “relativism” sticks best to the “positivists”
hurling the accusation.
7

13

JERRY PETERSEN
relativists,” Rorty holds, “they would, of course, be very easy to refute” (as cited in
McCloskey, 1994, p. 315, emphasis in original). The iron rule of irony is that
contrastive pairs only appear to offer a clear choice between contraries—when, in
fact, they can only name perspectives, attitudes, relevancies, and judgments about
the dramatic situation (Burke, 1969, pp. 511-513). And thus, all is not lost if the
threshold of rhetoric is crossed, as two plus two will still equal four, and besides,
McCloskey quips,
one does not give up the ability to distinguish between the Ajax Kitchen Cleanser
jingle and Gödel’s Proof by noting that both are designed with an audience in mind,
with perlocutionary force, with patterns of repetition, with a style suited to the
occasion, with an implied author, with metaphor, synecdoche, and all the rest.
(McCloskey, 1994, p. 290)

A rhetorical view of need satisfaction invested in the relationship between
economics and human communities is, it turns out, more cognizant of a deeply felt
and lived social reality than any “perfect” economic model can reveal. It is, at last,
the grown up approach to the most important human questions about how we will
live and die, and an optimistic and empowered response to what Thomas Carlyle
called an otherwise “dismal science.”
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